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The Role of Trust in the North Blackforest:
An Evaluation of a Citizen Panel Project*
Ragnar E. Lfstedt**
Introduction
Between January and June 1996, a public participation-citizen panel
project was undertaken in the North Blackforest Region by the Center
for Technology Assessment in Baden-Wurttemberg Stuttgart,
Germany. 1 The purpose of the project was to reach broad citizen
agreement regarding the siting of a municipal waste incinerator and two
biological/mechanical municipal waste disposal plants (aerobic
digesters) in the region. Federal legislation stipulates that by 2005 all
waste will need to be either incinerated or aerobically digested, as the
country's existing landfill sites will be prohibited from taking untreated
waste. In addition, the legislation calls for a regional network of waste
disposal facilities to reduce the need to transport waste over long
distances to large centralized disposal facilities.
Surprisingly, the project was successful in that the citizen panels
agreed on three sites within the allotted time. However, regional
politicians have not yet implemented the recommendations of the
panels, citing new information regarding excess capacity at waste
incinerators in nearby Tubingen and Stuttgart. Based on this
Field work was conducted while I was a research fellow at the Centre for
Technology Assessment in Baden Wurttemberg, Stuttgart, Germany from in 1997.
The study was supported by a grant from the Centre.
I am grateful to those who provided material for this aper and commented on
earlier drafts: Diana Hargreaves, Laura Kelly, Sabine Kirbele, Ortwin Renn, Elke
Schneider, Monica Shrimpf, Katharina Z611er and three referees. Special thanks goes
to Elke Schneider who not only set up interviews with panellists but also drove me to
homes all over the North Blackforest. I am also grateful to individuals from citizen
panels who agreed to be interviewed as well as to Mayors Frank and Theurer who saw
me on short notice.
** Dr. L6fstedt is a Reader in Social Geography at the Risk Research Group, Centre
for Environmental Strategy, University of Surrey (U.K.). He received his B.A.
(Geography) from U.C.L.A., and M.A. and Ph.D. (Geography) from Clark
University. Email: R.Lofitedt@surrey.ac.uk.
1 A not-for-profit think tank supported by the State of Baden-Wurttemberg,
henceforth abbreviated by its German name, Academy.
*
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information, they are not sure how great the need is to build new
facilities in the North Blackforest Region.
The results of the project have been evaluated and discussed in
some depth, including: collection of quantitative data on the
participating citizen panellist's views of the various actors involved in the
process both during and after its completion; 2 evaluation of the
recommendations of the citizen panels; 3 and an internal evaluation of
the entire process by the Academy. 4 Beyond that, data from the
project has generated several advanced degree studies and countless
other analyses. The purpose of this paper is not to evaluate these studies,
but rather to add an additional dimension to the overall project:
examining the importance of trust throughout the citizen panel process.
The role of trust and how it evolved is examined from the perspectives
of the panellists, the media, and local policy makers. These policy
makers include local mayors, local Members of Parliament (MP), heads
of the various city or town councils, and heads of the various ministries
in the State of Baden Wurttemberg.
In this paper, trust is defined as the bond of society in which one
party is willing to be vulnerable or reliant on another based on the belief
5
that the latter party is competent, open, fair, concerned and reliable.
Background
In 1992 the four local councils in the North Blackforest Region
(Calw, Enzkreis, Freudenstadt and Pforzheim) formed an intraregional corporation called Gesellschaft zur Planung der
Restabfallbehandlung in der Region Norschwarzwald (PAN). PAN is
2 See Volker Vorwerk & Erik Kamper, Evaluation der 3 Phase des
Burgerbeteiligungsverfahrens in der Region Nordschwarzwald (1997).
3 See Katharina Z8ller & Ortwvin Renn, Burgerbeteiligung an der Abfallplanung
fur die Region Nordschwarzwald: Burgergutachten Teil
Standortauswahl, Band 1
Empfehlungen (1996).
4 See Ortwin Renn et al., Burgerbeteiligung an der Abfallplanung fur die Region
Nordschwarzwald: Endbericht (1997).
5 See Martin Hollis, Trust Within Reason (1998); John Locke, Essays on the Law
of Nature (Wolfgang Von Leyden ed., 1965) (1663); Aneil K. Mishra,

m:

OrganisationalResponses To Crises: The Centrality of Trust, Trust in Organisations:
Frontiers of Theory and Research (Roderick M. Kramer and Tom R. Tyler eds.,
1996), p. 2 6 5; Ortwin Renn & Debra Levine, Credibility and Trust in Risk

Communication, Communicating Risks to the Public (Roger Kasperson & Pieter Jan
Stallen eds., 1991).
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made up of representatives of each county's parliament with a
governing board consisting of their leading executives. PAN's
professional staff have backgrounds in engineering, economics, and
local planning. PAN was set up as the main vehicle to achieve the intraregional waste plan as stipulated in federal legislation passed by the
German Federal authorities. After setting the issue of waste reduction
potential and the selection of appropriate waste reduction technologies,
PAN's main task was to identify areas in the region that would be
suitable for a waste plant. Stuttgart's highly reputable engineering
company, Buro Fichtner, was awarded the task to locate possible sites.
The study was completed in 1995 and it identified no less than 228
possible sites, of which eleven were deemed most suitable. Of these
eleven sites, five were considered suitable for a waste or "hot"
incinerator, and six suitable for an aerobic or "cold" digester. In 1994,
PAN, impressed by the results of Professor Ortwin Renn's citizen panel
projects in Switzerland, 6 asked him and his colleagues at the
Academy to conduct a citizen participation study to help identify three
7
sites (two cold and one hot) based on a series of criteria.
Using random sampling techniques, Renn and his colleagues invited
5440 citizens from the region to participate in the panels, and of these
198 accepted and 191 actually participated. The participants were
divided into ten groups, of which four focused on the siting of the
"hot" plant and six on the "cold" plants. Each group was facilitated by
two expert moderators who were either from the Academy or recruited
externally. The project lasted six months, during which the participants
considered written information and oral testimony from experts
covering the various waste technologies and geographical information
on the different sites. They also visited the eleven proposed waste sites,
as well as one waste incinerator in southern Germany and an aerobic
digester in northern Germany.
PAN hoped that by having citizens participate in the decision
making process the final sitings of the plants would be more publicly
acceptable, as citizens would be seen to have influenced the final
6 See Ortwin Renn, et al., Proceduraland Substantive Fairness in Landfill Siting,
7 Risk 145 (1996).
7
Some examples of criteria include suitability for transport, proximity to major
municipal waste sources, environmental considerations, etc.
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decision. However, it was made clear at the outset that the panels
would only provide recommendations to PAN and that the panellists
had no legislative power to implement the decisions they made.
Unfortunately, the citizen panel process was beset by a range of
problems. Many local policy makers felt that they were inadequately
informed because they received the information about the proposed
sites very late in the process, after the assessment of Buro Fichtner was
completed and became public knowledge. Due to lack of
communication between the various levels of policy decision making,
several of the mayors publicly complained that they received the
information after the panellists. Unfortunately, these circumstances
prejudiced some policy makers against the concept. 8 This prejudice
created distrust from the outset and made it more difficult to gain
political acceptance of the process once it began.
Further, the initial motives of the panellists appear to have been of
self-interest to prevent the waste plants from being sited near their
homes or communities. They were not necessarily motivated to find
the best waste management solution for the region. In addition,
although the sample was random, only about three per cent of the
individuals in the sample volunteered to take part. It is, therefore,
highly unlikely that these people accurately represented the population
of the region as a whole. The lack of participation in the citizen panels
by the public was also illustrated by the low level of attendance at the
various exhibits on the panel process and the waste issues, arranged by
the Academy in town halls throughout the region. In Horb, for
example, only six citizens turned up even though the event was
publicised in the local newspaper. The mayor of Horb blamed the low
turn out on poor advance warning and the fact that the exhibition was
not open in the evenings, while the Academy felt the low turnout was
primarily due to lack of interest. 9
To avoid political manipulation of the panels, the Academy
excluded individuals involved with local and/or national politics from
participating. This further alienated local policy makers, many of whom
8
See Drei Grunde gegen die Mullverbrennung, Sudwest Presse (November 22,
1995).
9 Mayor Michael Theurer of Horb made this statement during an interview with
the author.
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expressed their critical views to the local press. In areas where there were
high concentrations of political activists they tried to discredit the
selection process by citing that it was no longer random because not all
10
citizens (i.e. politicians) were allowed to participate.
The process itself was also hampered by the accuracy of the
information supplied to the panels. There was a debate in the media
regarding how much waste was actually produced in the region, and if
indeed it was necessary to build two aerobic digesters and one waste
incinerator. Hence many policy makers argued that the assumptions on
which the panellists were working were flawed. Due to increased
recycling, the amount of waste produced in the region is decreasing
significantly. For example, in 1996 in the State of Baden Wurttemberg,
the average citizen produced 263 kilos of waste, only half of that
produced in 1991.11 Many policy makers argue that by the year 2005,
waste production will be so low that it could be incinerated in other
towns such as Tubingen, where there would be excess capacity, or waste
could be landfilled locally.
However, this argument ignores the legislation of the German
government which directs that no matter how much waste is produced
(and there is a belief that the amount of waste cannot fall significantly
below present levels), interregional solutions must be in place by the
12
year 2005 because the landfilling option will no longer be allowed.
In fact, some experts argue that the present reason for excess capacity at
various incinerators in southern Germany is not recycling, but rather
that landfill owners are desperate to fill their sites ahead of the 2005
deadline and are undercutting the waste dumping fees of the
incinerator operators. 13 Throughout, the media played a major role in
reporting the differing views of the parties involved in the process.
Methodology
The study is based on two methodologies: in-depth qualitative
interviews, and content analysis. The in-depth qualitative interviews
10 See Im Burgerforum werden Fakten vermisst, Schwarwalder Bote (January 16,
1996).
1 See Mullmenge hat sich in funfJahren halbiertk, Schwarwalder Bote (July, 26
1996).
12
13

See Schwarwalder Bote, supra note 10.
Opinions gathered through personal communication with the author.
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focus on one panellist from each of the ten panels. In addition, there is
analysis of some of the quantitative interview data provided by the
Bielefeld group, interviews with two of the leading policy makers in the
region, 14 and interviews with members of the Academy who actively
participated in the project. These qualitative interviews with the two
mayors and the ten panellists lasted anywhere from 50 minutes to over
two hours. The object of these interviews was to explore the panellists'
and the mayors' perceptions of the project. A detailed questionnaire
was produced for the interviews which was examined and scrutinized
by the researchers at the Academy for both content and clarity.
This aspect of the study is weak because only ten people were
interviewed and the sample was non-representative. Thus, their views
are not necessarily those of other panellists. By using the in-depth
qualitative interviews, the author uncovered much information which
would been unavailable via a standard quantitative study.
A second aspect of the study was a content analysis of local
newspaper articles. This began a month before the start of the project,
in November, 1995. It continued until March 1997, and included all
available newspapers in the region (Schwarzwalder Bote, Stuttgarter
Zeitung and Sudwest Presse). All articles from those papers regarding
the topic were examined. Analysis was greatly helped by the Academy's
media archive, which contains every related article for the period. The
content analysis was not designed to uncover how many or what type of
articles were written on the citizen panel waste project, but rather to
gather background information for the qualitative questionnaire and to
gauge the media's attitudes toward panels. In this regard, editorials
15
were particularly important.
14 Mayor Michael Theurer of Horb, who was one of the most vocal critics of the
citizen panel concept and Mayor Sigberd Frank of Pforzheim, who was also the Chair
of Gesellschaft zur Planung der Restabfallbehandlung der Region Norschwarzwald or

PAN, the group that funded the citizen panels. Mayors Theurer and Frank were
chosen because they represent opposing views in the discussions regarding the

usefulness of citizen juries in general. In the content analysis, Frank was portrayed as
the most positive of the policy makers to the jury concept, and Theurer one of the

most negative. In thjs regard they do not fully represent the views of all the policy
makers in the Black Forest Region. In fact, the mayors of the other surrounding towns

were also somewhat sceptical toward the process.
15

The study was conducted when the main author was seconded to the Academy

for a two month period in early 1997. The author conducted all interviews in German.
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Role of Trust in UnderstandingRisk Communication

The two schools of thought in the area of risk communication are
"top-down" and dialogue. Top-down communication refers to the
actions of policy makers and industry sending persuasive messages to
assure the general public to feel secure. Reciprocal or dialogue risk
communication actively involves the public in discourse about a risk
decision when the discourse directly affects that decision. The citizen
panel approach is an example of reciprocal or dialogue risk
communication. To date, most risk communication efforts such as the
one surrounding the Brent Spar or BSE controversies in Europe and
16
North America, have been "top-down" projects.
Observed results of these top-down programmes have been
disappointing. 17 Researchers have tried to identify the reasons why
they have failed, and among the most likely explanations is the lack of
trust between the public and policy makers. 18 In other words, the
programmes have not been successfull because the policy makers and
industrial officials trying to persuade the public using a top-down
strategy have failed because they are not seen as trustworthy. This lack
19
of trust is based on past experience, competence or shared values.
The lack of trust toward policy makers and industrial officials is
seen to cause difficulties in siting new plants and installations (e.g. siting
nuclear waste storage facilities in Nevada) as well as problems in crises
management (e.g. chemical spills, Brent Spar and BSE). 2 0 In turn, the
lack of trust is seen by outside observers as being unnecessarily costly
for developers, regulators and, indirectly, the taxpayers. 2 1 Researchers
16 See National Research Council, Improving Risk Communication (1989);
National Research Council, UnderstandingRisk (1996).
The author is grateful to one of the referees who helped to clarify the concepts of
trust and risk communication.
17 See George Cvetkovich et al, Prescriptive Considerations for Risk
Communication (1986); Paul Slovic and Donald T. MacGregor, The Social Context
of Risk Communication (1994).
18 See Roger E. Kasperson et al., Siting Hazardous Facilities and Communicating
Risks Under Conditions of High Social Distrust,48 J. of Soc. Iss. 161 (1992); Paul
Slovic, Perceived Risk, Trust, and Democracy, 13 RiskAnal. 675 (1993).
19 See Ragnar E. L6fstedt & Tom Horlick-Jones, Environmental Regulation in the
UK: Politics, Institutional Change and Public Trust, Social Trust: Advances in
Concepts and Research, (George Cvetkovich and Ragnar E. Lbfstedt eds.,
forthcoming).
20 See Kasperson, supra note 18.
21 See LbSfstedt, supra note 19.
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have shown that events such as Brent Spar decrease public trust. 2 2
Policy makers further fuel public distrust by failing to adequately deal
23
with most crises.
These controversies have led to serious problems for the waste
disposal and chemical industries in North America and Europe. Due to
a lack of trust, it is becoming increasingly difficult to site and build
hazardous waste disposal facilities, ordinary waste incinerators, 24 and
sewage treatment plants or power plants. 25 In the U.S., for example,
where around 300 million tons of hazardous waste is produced each
year, 26 no large free-standing disposal facility has been sited since
1980.27 In some countries it is even becoming difficult to site and
build renewable energy plants, such as wind farms and biomass-to28
energy plants due to public opposition.
To combat this siting and building "stalemate", two solutions have
been proposed. One is to move away from involving the "irrational"
29
public and focus on stronger risk assessment and sound science.
Supporters of this view argue that only stricter peer review, assessment
22 See Ragnar E. Ldfstedt & Ortwin Renn, The Brent Spar Controversy: An
Example of Risk Communication Gone Wrong, 17 RiskAnal. 131 (1997).
23 See William Freudenburg, Risky Thinking: Irrational Fears About Risk and
Society; 545 The Annals of the Am. Acad. of Polit & Soc. Sci. 44 (1996); William
Freudenburg, Strange Chemistry: Environmental Risk Conflicts in a World of
Science, Values, and Blind Spots, Handbook of Environmental Risk Decision
Maldng (C.R. Cothern ed. 1996).
24 See Ragnar E. Lafstedt, Evaluation of Siting Strategies: The Case of Two UK
Waste Type Incinerators, 8 Risk 63 (1997); Judith Petts, The Public-Expert
Inteface in Local Waste Management Decisions: Expertise, Credibility and Process,
6 Public Understanding of Science 359 (1997).
25 See Patrick Field, et al., Risk and Justice: Rethinking the Concept of
Compensation, 545 The Annals of the Am. Acad. of Polit. & Soc. Sci. 156 (1996).
26 Id.
27 See Charles Piller, The Fail-Safe Society: Community Defiance and the End of
American Technological Optimism (1991); Barry G. Rabe, Beyond NIMBY:
Hazardous Waste Siting in Canada and the United States (1994).
28 See Diana Hargreaves, An Investigation Into Risk Communication: Issues
Surrounding a Proposal to Site a 20 MW Straw-Burning Plant at Calne, Wiltshire in
1994 (1996).
29 See Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk
Regulation (1993); National Research Council, Risk Assessment in the Federal
Government: Managing the Process (1983). For an extensive summary on the debate
surrounding risk assessment and management in the Federal Government see Robin
Cantor, Rethinking Risk Management in the Federal Government, 545 The Annals
of the Am. Acad. of Polit. & Soc. Sci. 135 (1996).
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of risk vs. risk tradeoffs, and cost benefit analysis can reduce value
driven conflicts. 3 0 The second solution is to increase trust among the
public by arguing that only through more participatory democracy and

31
more public involvement, can the problems be effectively addressed.
By actively involving the public, the need to trust the policy makers is

reduced by allowing the public to make meaningful decisions.
Policy makers, especially Breyer, feel that strict risk assessment will
only alienate the public and cause greater distrust. 3 2 Additionally, it is
argued that public involvement, especially at the local level, will reveal
"blind spots" which traditional risk assessments miss. This is because the

public has greater local knowledge than external experts 33 and can
suggest more locally appropriate solutions. 34 Finally, it has been
pointed out that experts themselves may be biased or at least motivated

by interest and values like everybody else, and that most participants in
the risk debate "have fundamentally different values and priorities
which

shape

their

definition

and judgments

of risk

and

acceptability," 3 5 be they lay citizens or experts. 3 6 It is fair to say,
however, that most public participation exercises have taken place only
after a controversy has arisen. Hence, distrust has already been in place

when a risk communication dialogue process has been adopted.
30 See A.M. Freman, The Measurement of Environment and Resource Values:
Theory and Models (1993); John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, Risk Versus
Risc Tradeoffs in Protecting Health and the Environment (1995).
31 See Breyer, supra note 29; Howard Kunreuther & Paul Slovic, Science, Values
and Risk, 545 The Annals of the Am. Acad. of Polit. & Soc. Sci. 116 (1996);
National Research Council, Understanding Risk: Informing Decisions in a
Democratic Society (1996); Ortwin Renn et al., Fairness and Competence in Citizen
Participation (1995); Ortwin Renn et al., Procedural and Substantive Fairness in
Landfill Siting, 7 Risk 145 (1996).
32 Id.; see Breyer, supra note 29.
33 See Freudenburg, supra note 22; Ray Rappaport, Risk and the Human
Environment, 545 The Annals of the Am. Acad. of Polit. & Soc. Sci. 64 (1996);
Brian Wynne, May the Sheep Safely Graze?, Risk, Environment and Modernity:
Toward a New Ecology (Scott Lash et al., ed. 1996).
34 See Nick Pidgeon, Technocracy, Democracy, Secrecy and Error, Accident and
Design: Contemporary Debates in Risk Management, (Chris Hood & David K.C.
Jones eds. 1996).
35 Leroy C. Gould et al., Perceptions of Technological Risks and Benefits 54
(1988).
36 See William Freudenburg, Perceived Risk, Real Risk: Social Science and the
Art of Probabilistic Risk Assessment, 242 Science 44 (1988); Christopher
Hohenemser, et al., The Nature of TechnologicalHazard 220 Science 378 (1983).
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This case offers the opportunity to examine whether public
participation increased the likelihood that the siting process would be
accepted. In other words, did use of citizen panels increase credibility
of, and public trust towards, the siting process?
The Citizen PanelConcept

Citizen panels, sometimes called planning cells, originated in
Germany. They have been used since 1972 to give citizens a chance to
take part in local planning. Unlike the citizen jury process in which the
jurors are actually empowered to make decisions for a certain
community, the role of the panellists is to offer advice to policy makers.
The first test run took place in 1972-1973 in Schwelm, Germany where
citizens participated in the planning of a waste disposal facility. Since
the 1970's, approximately 26 cities throughout Germany have used
citizen panels as a method for local planning. 37 More than 2600 adults
have participated in these citizen panels to date, and the citizen panel
concept has also been used in Switzerland, 38 Spain 39 and the U.S.
Citizen panels are not problem free, however. For example, they are
not useful in helping to solve disputes where major inequities between
social groups or regions are present. Additionally, as the panellists only
provide advice and are not responsible for their actions, they cannot be
40
relied upon for accountability or long-term planning.
Results
The results of this study have been divided into several parts.
Although all the data was gathered retrospectively, the survey covered
the panellists' and policy makers' views before, during and after the
process, and the results follow this format with a particular reference to
the role of trust. Part one focuses on the panellists', policy makers' and
media's views on the citizen panels and the involved actors (PAN and
the Academy) at the outset of the process. The next part focuses on the
37 See Peter C. Dienel & Ortwin Renn, Planning Cells: A Gate To "Fractal"
Mediation, Fairness and Competence in Citizen Participation (Ortwin Renn et al.
eds., 1995).
38 See Renn et al., supra note 4.
39 See Peter C. Dienel, Nucleos de Intervencion Participativa: Un Paso Hacia la
Democracia (forthcoming).
40 See Dienel, supra note 37.
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policy makers', panellists' and the media's views during the process
itself, while part three looks at the same groups' views toward the
process once the citizen panel project was completed. The final part
describes the current situation.
Views at the Outset of the Process
With the exception of PAN, who funded the process and therefore
supported the Academy, the other actors were either neutral or
41
somewhat sceptical:
42
One panellist said:
I only wanted to participate to make sure that we didn't get
a disposal facility in our village. In fact, I was sure that most
of the people who signed up felt the same way. They all
came from communities where a site was proposed and I
guess that even though they were sceptical, maybe they felt
they could do something useful for their respective villages.
Who in their right mind would want a waste treatment
plant next door anyway?
Another participant felt that receiving money for participating was
43
odd and thought it might be a bribe:
I almost didn't take part in the study as I felt it was very
strange that I would be paid to participate (700 DM). It
made me very distrustful of the whole process as it felt like a
bribe and I wondered whether the Academy had already
developed a solution. In the end I went along anyway to
make sure the plant would not be sited in my village.
The views of the politicians interviewed for the study differed from
one another regarding the potential of the process. Mayor Frank from
Pforzheim, who also was the Chair of PAN, felt that the process was
44
important for a series of reasons:
I have always been a proponent of the citizen panel process,
and I had no misgivings on awarding the Academy the
contract to conduct such a process here in North
Blackforest. I felt then, as I do now, that a citizen panel
41 The interviews with the panellists were conducted in German and taped for
further analysis, while the interviews with Frank and Theurer were not taped and the
quotes from them are based on short hand notes. As the quotes here have been
translated they are not verbatim, rather, they are an accurate description of what the
interviewee said.
42 Interview with panellist, Heike Nagold.
43

Interview with panellist, Helmut Eutingen.

44 Interview with Mayor Sigberd Frank from Pforzheim.
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process in cases such as this are necessary as we must have a
more open democracy in Germany. The public are
becoming less and less vocal on issues, and this is changing
the political landscape. It is important that the public
participate and see the benefits of contributing to the policy
making process. Especially on issues such as waste
management where nobody really wants these plants in their
community, public involvement can provide local insights
and improve people's acceptance of a need for a facility.
45
Mayor Theurer from Horb was more sceptical:
I am not against citizen panels per se, but I had problems
with this example. Firstly, the Academy gave the impression
that the concept was new and innovative and that it was
useful for the democratic process and should be used here.
This appeared very arrogant.... I did not feel that we (local
policy makers and citizens of Horb) could question the
process. Secondly, Horb has undergone a significant change
since I became Mayor. We have used citizen panellists and
have widespread public participation in policy making.
Therefore, the citizen panel process for the waste plant
sitings was not fully relevant for Horb. Why do we need to
experiment with citizen panels here when we firstly have
already had them previously, and secondly already have a
strong participatory democracy in the region with high level
of public involvement in local (village) policy making? It is
different.., where in places like Pforzheim, the public are
not involved in policy making and feel alienated....
Local newspapers were largely positive regarding the citizen panel
concept in the two months preceding the project. For example, in
November 1995, of ten articles on the subject, only two reported local
policy makers' criticism. At this stage no opinion/editorial pieces
appeared against the concept. The two aforementioned negative articles
picked up on the issue regarding politicians criticizing the process
46
because they were excluded from the panels.
The Role ofLocal Policy Makers in the Panels
Mayor Theurer was upset that local policy makers from Horb were
47
not included in the panels:
45 Interview with Mayor Michael Theurer from Horb.
46 See Burgerbeteiligung reine Alibifunktion, Schwalder Bote (Feb. 7, 1996); Die
Kritiker bleiben draussen, Sudwest Presse (Feb. 7, 1996).
47 Id.
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There are "policy makers" and there are "policy makers". In
this part of the region people are very active in politics, and
as I said before we have participatory democracy here. Of
25,000 citizens approximately 200 are active in politics. This
is much higher than in Pforzheim where the figure is about
50 individuals per 100,000 people. Also a large number of
the local politicians do have community interests as their top
priority.
The issue of including policy makers in the process was also brought
48
the panellists:
by
up
I felt that it was not necessary to have local policy makers
involved. They wanted to maintain some control and by
being cut out they weren't able to. We handled the issues
perfectly well without them. I really felt that the issue was
exaggerated out of all proportion.
49
Another panellist said:
I do feel that [Mayor] Theurer had a point about local
policy makers having a right to participate as they are
citizens too, but the panel process was not affected by not
having them participating.
On this point, the Academy had several views. Dr. Sabine K6rbele
who was responsible for the political context in the citizen juries stated
that:50
In retrospect maybe we should have included them. The
trouble that some policy makers made about their exclusion
did affect the credibility of the process early on, and it
could have been avoided. I don't feel that having some
policy makers on the panels would have influenced the
outcome significantly. However, that said, as policy makers
have other ways to influence the process, I still believe in
principle that it was correct not to include them.
Professor Renn, an Academy Director, felt that they were right to
stand by the original decision because the object of the panels was to
seek the participation of the public, not of policy makers who had other
channels to voice their views. 51
48 Interview with panelist, Lisa Motzingen.
49 Interview with panellist, Johan Horb.
50 Interview with Dr. Sabine K6rbele.
51 See Ortwin Renn, Premises of Risk Communication: Results of Two
Participatory Experiments, Communicating Risks to the Public: International
Perspectives (Roger E.Kasperson & Pieter Jan Stallen eds., 1991).
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Summary of the Views at the Outset of the Process
There were mixed views at the outset of the process. The citizen
panellists interviewed were somewhat sceptical about the process and
mostly participated to ensure that the waste plants would not be sited
in their neighbourhoods. The media remained largely neutral. As
expected of the policy makers interviewed, Mayor Frank was largely
52
positive and Mayor Theurer largely negative.
Role of Trust
At this stage in the process, trust was an important variable. The
citizens who participated in the panels did so as they did not trust the
siting process. Many did not believe that the process would be fair and
unbiased and participated to stop the waste plant from coming to their
neighbourhood. Also, local policy makers tried to discredit the process
by questioning its randomness. They felt excluded and, by discrediting
the whole process, believed that they could inject a feeling of distrust
among the public. 5 3 At this stage the panellists had not met the people

from PAN and the Academy and the media had not taken sides.
In order to maintain the integrity of the process the Academy did
not allow policy makers on the panels. The Academy asserted that
including policy makers would exert undue influence on the process.
This assertion was based on the fact that since there was a low turn out
(200 out of 5440 citizens or approximately 3%) policy makers would
be in a position to manipulate the process. In other words, if policy
makers had been included, given their apparent keenness to influence
the process, they could have been a significant presence in each panel.
The Citizen Panels in Action
Once the project got under way, criticism from the excluded policy
makers intensified. In Horb, policy makers hired a consultant to advise
them on the citizen panel process because they did not feel that the
Academy had the necessary expertise. This consultant was also used to
contribute to newspapers articles and participate in media and council
discussions on the problems with the process.
52

See notes 44 and 45, supra.
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According to two panellists, Theurer and colleagues hired a consultant to question

the professionalism of Professor Renn, and his colleagues, in order to discredit the
process. Based on this evidence, the author makes the hypothesis that such activities
were deliberately calculated to inject a feeling of distrust among the public.
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However, as the process progressed, criticism died down among the
policy makers and, just before the publication of the panel findings, the
media began to argue in favour of the process. As a result, the panellists
were surprised how the points of view had changed over time and, as a
result, their own scepticism subsided.
54
One panellist said:
At the first meeting I was highly sceptical. I did not believe
that we would come to any firm conclusion. I also did not
like Prof. Renn; I felt that he was very distant from the
panellists. However, by the end of the process I was quite
happy about the whole thing. We had worked hard and
came to an agreement with the other panellists which was
satisfactory. I even felt that I could trust Prof. Renn.
55
Another panellist described how she changed her mind:
I joined the process as I did not want the waste plant in my
village. I mean no one can trust the policy makers to help
you come up with a right decision, so it is better to be a part
of it. I am happy with the solution that we came up with....
However, retrospectively, I do feel that the site close to my
village would also have been appropriate. And I wouldn't
have minded so much as it was better suited than several
others in the region.
The policy makers interviewed did not change their views
significantly throughout the process. Mayor Frank was positive
56
throughout:
I have supported the process from beginning to end. I was
sure that Prof. Renn and his colleagues would do a good job
and they did. I really did not change my mind during the
citizen panel process. The outcome is more than satisfactory.
However, many of the policy makers in the region did not
want an aerobic digester or an incinerator in their
community and tried to discredit the process. They were
narrow minded and ignored the big picture. Although some
of these views can be understood as local policy makers are
concerned about their voters, I was surprised that the Greens
also acted in this way. They say they are open-minded
about different solutions, but in actuality this was not the
case.
54

Interview with panellist, Wolfgang Pforzheim.

55 Interview with panellist, Heike Nagold.
56 Interview with Mayor Frank from Pforzheim.
10 Risk. Health, Safety & Environment 7 [Wimter 1999]

Mayor Theurer did change his view of the process a little over time.
He denied that he tried to discredit the process but felt that it was
57
important to have an external consultant review it:
I am not an expert on citizen panels and neither are my
colleagues. Hence, I felt it was necessary to buy in this
expertise and that is why I hired a consultant. He provided
the expertise that we did not have and he showed that a lot
of what the Academy was saying was incorrect. Like the fact
that the panel idea was new to the region. Also, you must
not forget, there was a great deal of mistrust generated
against the Academy. A large amount of this distrust was
removed durin the citizen panel process although
personally, I still am distrustful of some members in the
Academy.
He reiterated his concern that local policy makers should have been
allowed to participate: "I remain unhappy that local policy makers were
not able to participate in the panels but I think that the concept is useful
58
and important to try so I tried to be less critical."
The Role ofMedia at this Stage
The content analysis also shows that more positive attitudes were
developing over the time they were operational. In January 1996, at the
outset of the process, there were 14 articles criticizing the panels out of
a total of 30 (only 2 were positive while 14 were neutral), but in May
only 6 out of 29 articles were negative (21 were neutral and 2 positive).
In examining the content of the articles an interesting transformation is
noticeable.
The initial articles against the process were scathing in their
criticism. One article compared the panels to a game show without
clear results and masquerading as democracy; branding the Academy as
nothing more than a well paid accomplice. 59 At the first panel sessions
panellists were quoted as saying "we wasted four hours" and "the
process did not impress me" and inferred that the process was being
60
manipulated by the mediators.
57 Interview of Mayor Theurer.
58 Id.
59 See Johannes Klomfass, Ausserdem-so ein Schwindel!, Sudwest Presse (Jan. 11,
1996).
60 See Im Burgerforum werden Fakten vermisst, Schwarzwalder Bote (Jan. 16,
1996).
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An editorial criticized the randomness of the process as the citizens
themselves could choose which group they participated in. As a result,
people from the same town/region could participate in the same
panel. 6 1 In the first two months, politicians criticized the process as
scandalous because only 200 people could participate and, therefore, it
62
was not a participatory democracy.
Further discussion focused on the policy makers' concern that the
public did not have enough knowledge. This was illustrated in a debate
in Horb where Renn and one of his associates, Dr. Krbele, debated
Mayor Theurer regarding the wisdom of the public. Kbrbele asked
whether the Mayor believed that the public were "as stupid as cows", a
rebuke which the policy makers did not properly address. Renn added
63
that one should never underestimate the knowledge of local citizens.
Since critical policy makers were unsuccessful in killing off the
process, they adopted a different tactic. The policy makers decided to
provide as much information as possible to the citizen panellists to help
them make the right decision. This was noted by one of the
64
panelists.
The Mayor in Horb organized several information meetings
for the panellists in the Horb area where he himself
participated. He wanted to make sure that we had the right
information at hand. I really felt that Mayor Theurer acted
most professionally and I have high respect for him
65
Another said, however:
I can't believe how much information we received. I felt that
we were over informed and I could not read all of it. It was
simply far too much. It would have been better if we had
gotten less information and that the information we
received had been better targeted.
61

See Am Rande Bemerkt: Fingerzeig, Schwarzwalder Bote (Jan. 20, 1996). This

accusation is not true. In fact, the citizen panel concept requires that the panels are
made up of individuals from different parts of the area in question and not just from
one village or town. See Dienel 1992, see Pidgeon, supra note 31; Hans Jorg Seiler,
Review of 'PlanningCells': A Problem of Legitimation, Fairness and Competence in

Citizen Participation (Ortwin Renn et al.eds., 1995).
62 See Skandaloses Scheinverfahren, Sudwest Presse (Jan. 25, 1996).
63 See Manfred Bujtor, Klarer Standpunkt zum Standort, Sudwest Presse (Feb. 7,
1996).
64 Interview with panellist, Johann Horb.
65 Interview with panelist, Sigrid Pforzheim.

10 Risk. Health, Safety & Environment 7 [Winter 1999]

In sum, after failing in the initial discrediting act, the goal of the
local politicians was to make sure that the panellists would not make the
wrong decision by giving them additional information. As the process
went on, the critical policy makers realized that they could not criticize
the process openly anymore, as this would question their commitment
to democracy and the empowerment of the people. As their criticisms
subsided so did the media's critique of the process, and simultaneously
the panellists' confidence grew as they were making progress in the
siting process.
While criticism of the process could be ascribed to a lack of
understanding and unfamiliarity with the concept in these early stages,
the hiring of a consultant in Horb appeared to try to directly
undermine the process by attacking the Academy's integrity. 6 6 This
included telling the public that the Academy should not be trusted 6 7
and accusing them of treating Horb residents as guinea pigs for their
own experiments. 6 8 Renn and his colleagues commented on some of
these claims reiterating that active citizens could participate in the
policy making process but not politicians and what the consultant
69
(Friedrich) was saying was untrue.
However, as the panels grew more cohesive and as work progressed
the criticisms declined. One panellist said:
In the beginning I was unsure what I was doing there, but we
grew into a team after a while. It was like it was us against
the various pressure groups and disgruntled local policy
makers and we wanted to make the right decision. 7 0
71
Another said:
The claims of us being manipulated really got on my nerves
and at first I did wonder about the Academy's motives, but
as time went on and as I got on with my work, I felt that the
Academy were independent and did the job very well, and
we became a team.
66 See Die Kritiker bleiben draussen, Sudwest Presse (February 7, 1996).
67 See Die Akademie erntet in Horb viel Misstrauen, Schwarzwalder Bote
(February 8, 1996).
68 See Harald Friedrich, Versuchskaninchen, Sudwest Presse (Mar. 1, 1996).
69 See Ortwin Renn, Infame Unterstellung,Schwarzwalder Bote, (Feb. 10, 1996).
70 Notes from interview with citizen panelist Lisa Motzingen.
71 Interview with panelist, Joseph Neuligen.
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The media itself also became more positive. One particular editorial
stated: "Cool. The whole process is going really well... [T]he citizens
have made a great step in the right direction." 72 The citizen panellists
were even prepared to defend themselves in the press, explaining why
73
they had decided on the particular locations for the waste facilities.
Summary of the Citizen Panels in Action
As the project got under way, the campaign by some local policy
makers to discredit the process continued and in some aspects
intensified, demonstrated by the hiring of a consultant in Horb. The
main objective appears to have been to pressure the BadenWurttemberg government into cancelling the project by injecting
distrust into the process.
The Role of Trust in the Action Phase
In part one, it was shown that the panellists themselves did not trust
the process and that is why they participated. By the end of part two,
citizen panellists came to believe in the project, so much so that they
could even consider having a waste plant in their village if they saw the
location as suitable. One of the main reasons why trust was built up was
the perceived competence of the Academy and the mediators.
Trust, however, was not easily built up, as policy makers,
particularly in Horb, tried to discredit the process as they could not
participate themselves. This backfired, as the arguments that the local
policy makers and the hired consultant used were proven to be
unfounded by the Academy and its denials were accepted by both the
panellists and eventually the media.
The overall impact of the local policy makers' critiques,
interestingly, appears to have been a decline in the panellists trust in
them while trust in the Academy and environmental organisations
74
increased. For example, according to one panellist:
Policy makers care only about themselves. They are driven
by power and greed and are little concerned about the
public except during elections. How can you trust them?
They will say one thing one day and another the next.
72 Manfred Bujtor, Ausserdem: Sankt Florian., Sudwest Presse (May 14, 1996).
73 See Werner Elsaesser & Herbert Gutekunst, Mull nicht durch die Stadt fahren,
Pforzheim Zeitung (June 1, 1996).
74 Interview with panellist, Helga Horb.
10 Risk- Health, Safety & Environment 7 [Winter 1999]

75

Another said:
This is all a game. Politicians are in the hands of industry.
Industry has power and money and this is what the policy
makers want. We have no money and no power so why
should they care about us?
One panellist focused on the influence of local policy makers: 76
They complained quite a lot, but we just got on with it. I
don't trust local policy makers as they are simply politicians,
and this episode did not make me trust them any more.
Outcome and DirectlyAfterwards
Immediately after the completion of the study and the presentation
of the results, the press and most of the policy makers were pleased
with the outcome. Against all expectations, the panels agreed that one
aerobic digester should be built in the South of the region. They felt
that no particular site in the south was suitable, but Horb was the
highest on the "short list". The panels agreed that the other aerobic
digester and the incinerator should be north of the region, with the
incinerator in Pforzheim and the other aerobic digester nearby. These
views were expressed by some of the panellists: 7 7
When we finished the process I was extremely happy. We
had done a great deal of work. I couldn't believe that it ever
would be finished. The solutions proposed were the right
ones.
Some felt that the process would be useful in other regions: "Of
course I would recommend the concept to other regions. It worked well
here and I am rather pleased." 78
Others, generally happy, felt that improvements could be made: 79
It is a concept that definitely should be repeated. But I
didn't like the debate surrounding whether politicians
should be allowed to participate in the process or not. Next
time this happens, let's put the local politicians in a separate
group and make them happy!
Finally, a citizen panellist complained about the lack of time: "I
liked the whole idea even though we had too little time. It is a way for
75
76
77
78
79

Interview with panellist, Rainer Neuligen.
Interview with panellist, Sigrid Pforzheim.
Interview with panellist, Wolfgang Pforzheim.
Interview with panellist, Helga Horb.
Interview with panellist, Heike Nagold.
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local citizens to participate in democracy and therefore it is something
80
that should be repeated."
Policy makers were generally happy with the outcome of the
81
process when the results were announced. Mayor Frank said:
I am especially pleased that the citizen panels were able to
agree on three sites for the waste plants. It shows that the
process worked. You know this issue that the citizens were
not smart enough and therefore needed help from policy
makers was completely unfounded. I mean the citizen
panellists know 90% more about the handling of wastes
than policy makers, and as you see I think the decision that
they made was the right one.
Even Theurer was almost convinced: "Inthe end the panellists did not
do a bad job, but I still wonder what the outcome will be. I wouldn't be
82
surprised if Horb was selected in the end anyways."
Summary of the Outcome Stage
During implementation of the citizen panels between January and
June, 1996, it was interesting to see how the various actors changed
their views from mainly critical to somewhat more positive. The main
reason appears to be that the panels were successful: three sites were
agreed on; and its handling of the process let the Academy build trust.
PostPanelProcess: The CurrentSituation
Although Mayor Frank and his colleagues at PAN accepted the
panel recommendations, they have not been implemented. There are
several reasons: First, Pforzheim citizens have refused to accept the
waste incinerator. This is a particular blow for Frank, who was so
supportive of the process. 8 3 Second, more importantly, less waste is
now produced in Germany. Thus, the need for two aerobic digesters
84
and a waste incinerator is being questioned locally.
Thus, the project is at a standstill. Siting an aerobic digester in the
north has been agreed on by policy makers in the that part of the North
80 Interview with panellist, Wolfgang Pforzheim.
81 Interview with Mayor Frank of Pforzheim.
82 Interview with Mayor Theurer.
83 See CDU Fraktion lehnt den Mullofen ab, Pforzheimer Zeitung (Aug. 14,
1996).
84 See Mullmenge hat sich in funfJahren halbiert,Schwarzwalder Bote (July, 26
1996).
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Blackforest, on the condition that policy makers in and around
Pforzheim agree to build the incinerator there. Public opinion in
Pforzheim opposes this, and no plants have been sited. Policy makers
have decided to undertake more economic and environmental studies.
This delay has undermined the consensus reached by panels. When
the citizen panel recommendations were not immediately accepted,
new public pressure groups (such as Pforzheim citizens against the
incinerator) began to form, questioning the outcome of the process.
For example, these groups have publicly said that "the Pforzheim
citizens who participated in panels were not really listened to by PAN,"
panellist selection was biased against Pforzheim. Finally, the groups
were critical of the Academy for not inviting their members to
participate when citizen panels visited proposed sites. 85
These developments were commented on by Mayor Frank who was
concerned about the fighting between citizen groups: "What I am
unhappy about is that today citizens are fighting with each other and
opposing the recommendations of the panels, returning to the criticisms
86
I thought had been dispelled through the process."
Further delays to the siting process, he felt, would make it more
difficult for policy makers to implement the recommendations of the
panels as opposition would continue to grow.87
It will be more difficult to build a waste incinerator in
Pforzheim today than it would have been in June 1996, after
the release of the study. However, as waste production is
continuously decreasing, we may not need such a large
incinerator in a few years time and if we build a smaller one
this may be more publicly acceptable
Summary of the PresentDay
As time passes, public trust toward the citizen panel solution is
eroding. The public in North Blackforest now disagree that one of the
incinerators and one of the digesters should be sited in the vicinity of
Pforzheim. The lack of concrete action on siting the plants gave those
opposed to the proposed sites the opportunity to organize themselves
85 See Andreas Gugau, Die Burger sollen Protest bekunden, Pforzheimer Zeitung
(Sept. 14, 1996).
86 Interview with Mayor Fank.
87 Id. It should be noted that it would be economically and technically impossible
to build a smaller incinerator than that proposed for the city of Pforzheim.
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and reopen the debate, particularly in Pforzheim. Mayor Frank has now
entered into dialogue with these groups in an attempt to find an
acceptable solution. However, this appears to further undermine the
citizen panel process and shows the transient nature of trust built up by
the process.
Conclusions
A series of conclusions can be drawn from this study. These have
been grouped around trust, the citizen panel approach, public
participation, and practical implications.
Trust
Trust/distrust played an important role throughout the process.
Distrust of local policy makers was an initial motivator for participation
in the citizen panels. Although some policy makers tried to discredit
the process, largely through co-opting the media, trust was built
broadly among the panellists and the press. There appear to be two
main reasons for this. First, the arguments put forward by policy
makers in the media were relatively transparent. It was evident that they
wanted to maintain control and the citizen panel process did not foster
this. Many policy makers also opposed the panel system as they felt
ordinary citizens were not competent to make decisions on these issues.
In effect policy makers, opposing the process, decreased their
trustworthiness in the eyes of the public.
Second, the Academy increased its credibility during the process.
The criticism levelled against it about the randomness of the samples
and lack of impartiality were seen to be unfounded by the participants
and, in fact, trust was built between the participants and the Academy.
From the author's perspective it was interesting to see how transient
trust actually is. Although some authors in the field of risk point out
that it is much easier to destroy trust than to build it up, and that once
lost it is difficult to regain, 8 8 this study shows how much trust can
vary and shift. In other words, even if trust has been lost, it can be
regained in a relatively short period of time. It would be interesting to
see if these results can be replicated. Maybe it is not as difficult to
regain trust as some researchers believe.
88

See Slovic, supra note 17.
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The Citizen PanelApproach
Although the panellists were self selected and most certainly
unrepresentative of the public as a whole (only about three per cent
chose to participate of those asked) the process resulted in widespread
acceptance among both the local media and the public. This is an
important finding because it shows that one does not need a fully
representative panel in order to achieve a credible process. However, this
may also be seen negatively, as it may then actually be possible to
manufacture trust for agencies and/or industry groups by using biased
89
processes, such as setting up nonrepresentative citizen panels.
The Role ofPublic Participationin the Siting Process
It is highly unlikely that a waste disposal plant could ever be sited in
the North Blackforest Region without some form of public
participation. Distrust of policy makers in Germany is high, as seen in
the case of siting and building a nuclear waste depository in Gorleben,
and imposition of these types of facilities on communities would most
likely have led to public protests. Because the public took some active
part in the decision making, the citizen panels brought legitimacy to the
process. The participants in the panels also proved themselves
competent to reach consensus for the locations of the plants, surprising
many sceptical policy makers and proving that the public can make
valid contributions to what has largely been regarded as an expert
process. However, the failure of local policy makers to act on the panels'
recommendations has devalued the process, to the extent that the
general public in the chosen locations now reject the legitimacy of the
process and are challenging its outcomes.
PracticalImplications
Practically, citizen panels can aid in siting noxious facilities if those
facilitating are competent and have public credibility. Further, political
indecisiveness makes the siting of noxious facilities much more difficult
and leads to amplified distrust.

89 I am grateful to one of the referees who highlighted this finding.

